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Paradise Lost and the Poetics of Encyclopedism
Milton’s Paradise Lost is extensively involved in the discourse seventeenth-century natural 
philosophy, a fact that has received considerable critical attention.1 However, readers alert to 
this aspect of the poem have tended to see certain passages as pronouncements of a theory of 
natural philosophy. This tendency has obscured the important fact that the type of 
seventeenth-century scientifc discourse in which Milton participated rejects the idea of the 
defnitive pronouncement. Stephen Fallon has argued that Milton’s monism amounts to a 
consistent philosophy of matter;2 I will argue, not that Milton’s philosophy is inconsistent, but 
that by framing it in the discourse of encyclopedism, Milton deliberately undermined the 
notion of a unifying or conclusive epistemology. I will draw parallels with Francis Bacon and 
Robert Burton to show that the discourse of encyclopedism in Paradise Lost makes all 
knowledge in the poem vitally preliminary, with the implication that the poem should be 
read, at all times, as a work in progress.
1 Notably Harinder Singh Marjara, Contemplation of Created Things (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 
1992) and Karen Edwards, Milton and the Natural World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999).
2 Stephen Fallon, Milton Among the Philosophers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
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Milton Among the Encyclopedists
‘The [Renaissance] encyclopedia,’ claims Neil Kenney, is ‘conceived ... as a circle of learning 
to be internalised within the mind of the well-rounded or exceptional individual’.3 In light of 
this point, the argument might be made that Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) 
and Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum (1620) should not be called encyclopedias, since both 
works deny the fnite conclusiveness of the possibility that an individual might ‘internalise’ 
knowledge. The Burtonian and Baconian methods are perhaps better understood as sub-
genres of encyclopedism which turn the ‘circle of learning’ inside-out—that is, their works cast 
the circle of learning so wide that it encircles the individual and cannot be satisfyingly 
internalised. 
Jonathan Sawday has suggested that ‘in the eighteenth century, [Burton’s] Anatomy  
became virtually unreadable’.4 The Anatomy fails to mark itself as defnitive, conclusive, or 
even fnished, in the way that eighteenth-century readers came to expect from printed texts: 
instead it is as ‘evanescent, transient, ... [and] provisional’ as speech.5 Sawday suggests that 
though we are still predisposed to see the provisional nature of the Anatomy as a peculiarity, 
Burton ‘was actually at the vanguard of the scientifc movement of the earlier seventeenth 
3 Neil Kenney, The Palace of Secrets: Béroalde de Verville and Renaissance Conceptions of Knowledge 
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1991), p.25.
4 Jonathan Sawday, ‘Shapeless Elegance: Robert Burton’s Anatomy of Knowledge’, in English
Renaissance Prose: History, Language, and Politics, ed. by Neil Rhodes (Tempe, AZ.: Medieval and
Renaissance Texts and Studies, 1997), pp.173–202.
5 Ibid., p.185.
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century’.6 Burton’s work was not ‘the result of a mind no longer in control of words’, but rather 
it ‘fashioned ... a fexible morphology so that new information could be reincorporated into the 
whole without the necessity of dismantling the entire structure’.7 Burton’s fexible morphology 
in no way aims to be defnitive. Neil Kenney has argued that in approaching Renaissance 
encyclopedic texts we should abandon modern conceptions of encyclopedias as ‘certain, 
objective, and compartmentalized’.8 Burton’s fexible morphology works on the presumption, 
alien to modern notions of encyclopedism, that the genre should ‘not only organise existing 
facts but also ... leave room for new ones that will be discovered’.9 Burton’s Anatomy is not a 
typical encyclopedia, but its fexible morphology is paradigmatic of a certain type of open-
ended Renaissance encyclopedic discourse.
Like Burton’s Anatomy, Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum attempts to establish a 
discourse of natural philosophy that ‘leave[s] room for new’ enquiry. Bacon’s preface begins:
Those who have presumed to make pronouncements about nature as if it were a 
closed subject, whether they were speaking from simple confdence or from motives 
of ambition and academical habits, have done very great damage to philosophy and 
the sciences. They have been successful in getting themselves believed and efective 
in terminating and extinguishing investigation.10 
6 Ibid., p.175. Sawday uses ‘earlier seventeenth century’ to mean the period from the 1620s to the
publication of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, i.e. 1689.
7 Ibid., pp. 189, 200.
8 Kenney, The Palace of Secrets, p.36.
9 Ibid., p.32.
10 Francis Bacon, Novum Organum (1620), ed. by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p.27. All subsequent references are to this edition.
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Traditional scientifc language is reductive, it ‘terminat[es] and extinguish[es] investigation’, 
whereas Bacon’s new instrument asks the reader not ‘to be content with what has been 
discovered, ... but to penetrate further’.11 Bacon’s aphoristic discourse, like Burton’s fexible 
morphology, seeks a position ‘between the ostentation of dogmatic pronouncements and the 
despair of lack of conviction’.12 Stephen Clucas has described Bacon’s intent as ‘to promote 
and invigorate dissatisfaction with contemporary philosophical discourse and its concepts and 
create new epistemological grounds from which to interrogate’.13 Bacon essentially announces 
the death of the conclusion, stipulating that all discourse be viewed as liminal, as a threshold 
opening on to ‘new epistemological grounds’, rather than an end in itself. 
Paradise Lost & the Burtonian ‘if’
The Baconian and Burtonian methodologies described above pervade Paradise Lost. In the 
Anatomy II.ii.3 (Air Rectifed, With a Digression of Air), Burton imagines himself ‘as a long-
winged hawk, ... still soaring higher and higher till he be come to his full pitch, and in the 
end ... comes down amain’. Like the hawk, Burton will ‘awhile rove, wander round about the 
11 Novum Organum, ‘Preface’, p.30.
12 Ibid., p.27.
13 Stephen Clucas, ‘“A knowledge broken”: Francis Bacon’s Aphoristic Style’, in English Renaissance 
Prose, ed. by Neil Rhodes (Tempe, AZ.: Medieval and Renaissance Texts and Studies,  1997), 147–72, 
p.163.
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world, mount aloft to those ethereal orbs and celestial spheres, and so descend to my former 
elements again’.14 This bears comparison with Milton’s address to Urania:
above the Olympian hill I soar, 
Above the fight of Pegasean wing
…Up led by thee, 
Into the Heaven of Heavens I have presumed,
An earthly guest, and drawn empyreal air, 
Thy tempering. With like safety guided down, 
Return me to my native element15
The similarity between the two passages is more than coincidental: Milton’s celestial 
perspective is not simply a trope for literary or spiritual inspiration, but a participation in a 
seventeenth-century way of studying the natural world. Comparing Paradise Lost to Robert 
Hooke’s Micrographia (1665), Lara Dodds fnds that ‘like the microscope, Paradise Lost  
reveals a world quite other than our own’.16 The extreme perspectives of microscope and 
telescope, by which Milton is ‘up led’ and ‘guided down’, create what Dodds calls 
‘estrangement’, a process which forces a reconsideration of the relations between things.
When Burton roams the globe as an eagle, he poses scores of questions, from the 
geographical—‘The pike of Tenerife how high is it?’17—to the biological—‘do [Muscovite 
14 Robert Burton, The Anatomy of Melancholy (1621) ed. by Holbrook Jackson (New York: New York 
Review of Books, 2001), II.ii.3, pp. 34–5. All subsequent references are to this edition.
15 John Milton, Paradise Lost, ed. by Alastair Fowler (London: Longman, 2007), VII.3–16. All 
subsequent references are to this edition.
16 Lara Dodds, ‘Rhetorical Microscopy in Paradise Lost’, in Milton Studies 47 (2008): 96–117, p.98.
17 Anatomy, p.37. 
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birds] sleep in winter, like Gesner’s Alpine mice?’18 Each question creates an unfulflled 
potential, a problem to be solved, revealing mysteries rather than certainties, estranging the 
natural world. When Milton soars ‘above the Olympian hill’ he too makes the world appear 
strange. Raphael’s conversation with Adam is likewise conducted in Burtonian questions:
What if the sun 
Be centre to the world, and other stars
By his attractive virtue and their own 
Incited, dance about him various rounds? 
...six thou seest, and what if seventh to these 
The planet earth, so steadfast though she seems, 
Insensibly three diferent motions move?
...What if that light 
Sent from her through the wide transpicuous air
To the terrestrial moon be as a star 
Enlightening her by day, as she by night 
This earth? Reciprocal, if land be there,
Fields and inhabitants.19
In his notes on these lines, Alastair Fowler cites the Anatomy II.ii.3, which reads ‘if the earth 
move, it is a planet, and shines to them in the moon, and to the other planetary inhabitants, as 
the moon and they do to us upon the earth’.20 The Burtonian ‘if’ (almost ffty clauses begin 
‘if...’ in the Digression of Air) marks Raphael’s speech as conjecture. Raphael provides Adam 
with questions, not answers, thrusting him into the uncertain space of ‘what if?’, where 
discourse is proposition, not conclusion. Joanna Picciotto has described encyclopedic 
18 Ibid., p.38.
19 Paradise Lost, VIII.122–144.
20 Anatomy, p.53
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discourse as ‘the production of alien experiences of the known world’.21 The potential of 
Raphael’s ‘What if?’ is quite literally ‘the production of alien experiences’: if the universe is 
heliocentric, and if the earth is the seventh planet, might there be ‘inhabitants’ on the moon?
Paradise Lost & Baconian ‘instances’
‘The subtlety of Nature’, writes Bacon in the Novum Oragnum, ‘is far greater than that of the 
sense and the understanding, so that all our beautiful speculations and guesses and 
controversies are absurd.’22 At face value this sounds like an indictment of speculative 
discourse like the Burtonian ‘if...’, but what appears a criticism is actually a statement of a vital 
precondition for discussing the natural world. Karen Edwards makes a similar point in 
relation to Milton, which throws light on Bacon’s statement:
There is nothing “natural” without the mediating work of the human understanding. 
But precisely because it is necessary to construe in order to understand, we are not 
limited to those myths that we have produced before us; we can re-form our myths.23
If nothing is to be accepted as fact, all ‘beautiful speculations’ should be considered ‘absurd’, 
but this is not to say they should be dismissed without consideration. ‘[T]he subtlety of nature 
21 Joanna Picciotto, ‘Reforming the Garden: The Experimentalist Eden and Paradise Lost’, in English 
Literary History 72 (2005): 23–78, p.26.
22 Novum Organum I.10, p.34.
23 Edwards, Milton and the Natural World, p.114.
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is far greater than ... the understanding’, but since the understanding is, as Edwards makes 
clear, indispensable, the only viable method, to Bacon, is proliferation of ‘speculations’: if the 
absurdity of resting at a single speculation is acknowledged, multiple ‘speculations’ can be 
allowed to build up to a plural ‘sense and ... understanding’. Burton’s practice of stacking 
question upon question, then, is not alien from the Baconian method, and the absurdity of the 
defnitive answer is fully acknowledged by the Burtonian ‘if’.
Bacon summarises his method in the Novum Organum:
The investigation of forms proceeds thus: a nature being given, we must frst of all 
have a muster or presentation before the understanding of all known instances which 
agree in the same nature, though in substances the most unlike. And such collection 
must be made in the manner of a history, without premature speculation, or any great 
amount of subtlety. For example, let the investigation be into the form of heat.24
To determine what ‘heat’ is, every substance that can be said to have or lack heat must be 
listed. To compile such a list is the work of the ‘natural and spontaneous movements of the 
mind’.25 ‘Premature speculation’, that is, preconception or expectation, is forbidden, and heat 
is not ‘understood’ but rather ‘all known instances’ are presented ‘before the understanding’. 
The ‘understanding’ takes a passive role – it mustn’t interpret or speculate, but remain open to 
more and more ‘instances’. Some of Bacon’s ‘instances’ of heat are
24 Novum Organum II.11, p.110.
25 Ibid., ‘Preface’, p.28.
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1.  The sun’s rays... 
2. The sun’s rays refected... 
3. Fiery meteors. 
4. Burning thunderbolts. 
5. Eruptions of fame from hollows in mountains.26
A similar listing of ‘instances’ is employed by Milton in his description of Satan’s progress 
through chaos:
so eagerly the fend 
O’er bog or steep, through straight, rough, dense, or rare,
With head, hands, wings, or feet pursues his way,
And swims or sinks, or wades, or creeps, or fies.27 
Fowler explains the asyndeton here as ‘Miming the atomised, unstructured state of chaos, and 
its hectic confusion of sense-data’.28 This is only a partial explanation. With the Novum 
Organum in mind, the passage becomes not so much a chaotic ‘confusion of sense-data’ as a 
Baconian enquiry into the possible substance of chaos. Milton is re-forming chaos with each 
word. Just as heat can be a meteor, and it can be a volcano, so chaos can be a bog, and a steep, 
it can be rough, and dense. These possibilities are presented by Milton as if to the Baconian 
understanding, which must accept them ‘without premature speculation’. Attempting to 
understand the passage as a cohesive picture results in a ‘hectic confusion of sense data’.  
About Paradise Lost in general, Edwards concludes that ‘Reading such a text requires the 
humility to submit one’s conclusions to continual reassessment; without it, the fragments of 
26 Ibid., II.11, p.110
27 Paradise Lost II.942–50.
28 Alastair Fowler (ed.), Paradise Lost, p.157n.
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the world’s text are cemented into immobility.’29 ‘Continual reassessment’ is the key to 
reading Milton’s chaos. The ‘hectic confusion’ of instances should not be explained away as a 
special efect: it is symptomatic of a Baconian mode of enquiry which eschews cohesion.
It becomes even more apparent that a so-called ‘hectic confusion of sense-data’ is not 
simply a way of mimicking chaos when we realise that this tactic is employed throughout 
Paradise Lost. Satan, for example, is a wolf, cormorant, lion, tiger, toad, and a horse in Book IV 
alone.30 The earth is one minute a ‘wilderness ... grotesque and wild’, the next a ‘sylvan scene’, 
then ‘Mozambic’, with ‘Sabean odours’, and yet again a pastoral sheep fold, all within ffty 
lines.31 In considering the idea of ‘information overload’ Jonathan Sheehan fnds that 
Renaissance encyclopedists ‘refused to enforce levels of priority between diferent ... 
interpretive possibilities’.32 Milton’s apparently hectic descriptions are not a failure to build a 
cohesive picture, but an encyclopedic discourse that refuses to ‘enforce levels of priority’  
between the diferent possible ways of looking at his subjects. The most viable reading 
strategy for coping with the resultant information overload in Paradise Lost is that proposed 
by Edwards—to ‘submit one’s conclusions to continual reassessment’—that is, treat every part 
of the text as preliminary.
29 Edwards, Milton and the Natural World, p.98.
30 See Paradise Lost IV.183, 196, 402, 403, 800, 858.
31 Ibid., IV.135–5, 140, 161–2, 185.
32 Jonathan Sheehan, ‘From Philology to Fossils’, Journal of the History of Ideas 64 (2003): 41–60, 
pp.46, 51.
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‘If true, here only’
Having situated Paradise Lost in the context of an encyclopedic discourse that denies the act 
of concluding, I shall show how pervasive this discourse is throughout Paradise Lost. So far it 
has been seen only in passages that bear direct resemblance to extracts from Burton and 
Bacon, but the poetics of encyclopedism can be said to underpin the whole poem. I use the 
term poetics of encyclopedism not just because Paradise Lost transposes Baconian and 
Burtonian encyclopedism into verse, but because encyclopedic discourse is enacted by the 
very mechanisms of Milton’s verse, which explores scientifc ideas in diferent ways to the 
prose of Bacon or Burton.
Milton frequently uses the line break to explore Baconian and Burtonian possibilities:
Men called him Mulciber; and how he fell 
From heaven they fabled, thrown by angry Jove 
Sheer o’er the crystal battlements: from morn 
To noon he fell, from noon to dewey eve, 
A summer’s day: and with the setting sun 
Dropped from the zenith like a falling star, 
On Lemnos the Aegean isle: thus they relate, 
Erring; for he with this rebellious rout 
Fell long before.33
33 Paradise Lost, I.740–48
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In ‘Thus they relate, | Erring’ the pause between the two lines opens out the space between 
fact and fction, truth and error, conclusiveness and inconclusiveness. What is striking is that 
Milton relishes the erroneous story. Paradise Lost never seeks to deny the existence of error, 
rather it acts out the processes by which error is created, sustained, and fnally refuted. Until  
‘Erring’, the reader could be forgiven for taking the story of Mulciber’s fall at face value. 
However, ‘Erring’ drives home the implications of the initial ‘fabled’, reinforcing the necessity 
of the delicate reading practice Karen Edwards described as ‘the ability to submit one’s 
conclusions to continual reassessment’. The line break between ‘relate’ and ‘Erring’ vitally 
forestalls the collision between a fact and its undoing, relishing the space of multiple 
possibilities before the second half of the sentence reveals the fable to be a Baconian absurd 
speculation. Paradise Lost is not simply in the business of correcting error: the poem’s larger 
project is to demonstrate how pervasive error is, and to show that all conclusions must be 
interrogated and considered preliminary.
The expansion of the moment in which ‘beautiful speculations’ hang in the balance 
between truth and error is a common feature of Paradise Lost:
Groves whose rich trees wept odorous gums and balm, 
Others whose fruit burnished with golden ring 
Hung amiable, Hesperian fables true, 
If true, here only, and of delicious taste.34
34 Ibid., IV.250.
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In the encyclopedic discourse of Bacon and Burton, the only place in which any so-called fact 
is true is in the space between the presentation of one thing before the understanding, and the 
next. In this instance, ‘Hesperian fables’ can be true only in Eden, which ultimately proves to 
be a temporary space. The phrase ‘Hesperian fables true...’ appears to make a statement of 
fact—Hesperian fables, it seems to say, are true—and Milton extends and prolongs this 
possibility over the white space of the line break, allowing it to exist in the transition from one 
line to the next, before exposing it to absurdity. Hesperian fables are not only true ‘here [i.e 
Eden] only’, but true ‘here [i.e in the moment of speculation] only’.
‘Had’ and ‘had not’
At certain key moments Paradise Lost holds multiple possibilities and historical situations in 
balance. Not only are errors made momentarily true, alternative courses of Biblical history are 
imagined, as in the depiction of Satan falling through chaos:
He drops 
Ten thousand fathoms deep, and to this hour
Down had been falling, had not by ill chance 
16
The strong rebuf of some tumultuous cloud 
Instinct with fre and nitre hurried him
As many miles aloft.35 
The formula ‘had ... had not’ considers the possibility of something that didn’t happen. Again 
the line break comes in to play in opening up this otherwise redundant possibility: by placing 
‘to this hour’ at the end of the line, Milton plays with the possibility that Satan is still falling in 
this (the reader’s) time, before ‘had not by ill chance...’ closes of this possibility. Antony 
Welch writes that Milton’s ‘pivoting between space and time, ... [manipulates] the physical 
barriers of time and space that thwart the ability of “mortal men” to appreciate the magnitude 
of either distance.’36 There is a deliberate confusion of time and space in ‘to this hour | Down 
had been falling’, because it forces the reader to extend ‘Ten thousand fathoms’ to some even 
greater distance which would allow Satan to fall from prehistory to the present day. Our 
understanding, as Welch says, is deliberately ‘thwart[ed]’ by the ‘pivoting’ of space and time 
by which Milton hurls Satan through chaos, potentially endlessly. The momentary enabling 
of the impossible enacted by ‘had ... had not’ necessitates Edwards’s ‘continual reassessment’. 
It is like the Burtonian ‘if’, which alienates the familiar, or the Baconian absurd speculation 
which must be presented before the understanding, but not lingered upon.
35 Ibid., II.933–38.
36 Anthony Welch, ʻReconsidering Chronology in Paradise Lostʼ, in Milton Studies 41 (2002): 1–17, p.3.
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The formula ‘had ... had not’ recurs again and again in Paradise Lost. In Book II, as 
Satan and Death prepare to fght, ‘great deeds | Had been achieved, whereof all hell had rung, 
| Had not...’ Sin intervened.37 Similarly in Book IV ‘dreadful deeds | Might have ensued; | …
All the elements | At least had gone to wreck | ...had not’ God tilted ‘his golden scales’.38 
Catherine Martin calls Milton’s eclectic treatment of alternative possibilities ‘a schema which 
permits a maximally dialectical model of divine providence.’39 That is, the continual 
acknowledgement of alternative possibilities refuses to treat providence as rigidly dictated, by 
suggesting that potential events still exist in the imagined space of speculation. For this 
reason, Anthony Welch rejects Fowler’s attempt to determine how many days the action of 
Paradise Lost takes: 'the global chronologies of Fowler and others achieved their continuity at 
the expense of the reader's actual experience of time in the poem.'40 Time, in ‘the reader’s 
actual experience’, is splayed and fractured by encyclopedic ‘what if’s. Milton’s investigations 
of erroneous fables and things which didn’t happen call Thomas Browne’s Pseudodoxia  
Epidemica (1646) to mind. ‘To purchase a clear and warrantable body of Truth,’ writes 
Browne, ‘we must forget and part with much that we know’.41 Browne is in no hurry to ‘forget’ 
errors though: like Milton lingering over Mulciber’s fall, Browne only dismisses an error once 
it has been weighed and tested. Browne, like Milton, will treat an error (semi)-seriously before 
37 Paradise Lost II.723.
38 Ibid., IV.990–97.
39 Catherine Gimelli Martin, ʻThe Enclosed Garden and the Apocalypseʼ, in Milton and the Ends of
Time, ed. by Juliet Cummins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 144–168, p.149.
40 Welch, ‘Reconsidering Chronology’, p.13.
41 Thomas Browne, Pseudodoxia Epidemica (1646) ed. by Robin Robbins (Oxford: Clarendon, 1981), p. 
1.
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refuting it: ‘That the Forbidden fruit of Paradise was an Apple, is commonly believed, 
confrmed by Tradition, perpetuated by writings, verses, pictures’.42 Browne shares with 
Burton and Bacon the disinclination to draw conclusions. He views errors from all angles, 
analysing their sources and variations. Milton likewise relishes the space in which speculation 
about the possible truth of error can take place, before common errors are gradually realigned 
with biblical and experiential truth.
‘Earthly notions’ and ‘the dialect of men’
The gradual alignment of error with biblical truth and experience is the goal of the discipline 
known as Biblical accommodation.43 Kevin Killeen has said that accommodation makes a
cognitive leap that ... construes aspects of infnity for our comprehension. 
[Accommodation] came to inscribe the explanatory spaces between events, to fll in 
the gaps, and provide the relation—philosophical, scientifc, or historical—among 
biblical events.44
Milton is certainly interested in the ‘spaces between events’, but rather than ‘fll[ing] in gaps’, 
he expands and investigates them. I have shown Milton engaged in estranging the natural 
world with his telescopic vision, and opening up the gaps between fact and error, ‘had’ and 
42 Ibid., p.536.
43 See Neil D. Graves, ʻMilton and the Theory of Accommodationʼ, in Studies in Philology 98 (2001):
251–72, and John Reichert, Miltonʼs Wisdom: Nature and Scripture in “Paradise Lost” (Ann Arbour:
Michigan University Press, 1992).
44 Kevin Killeen, ʻAccommodation in Burnetʼs Sacred Theory and Paradise Lostʼ, in Milton Studies 46
(2007): 109–113.
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‘had not’. He also repeatedly calls attention to the preliminary and make-shift nature of all 
human discourse. For example:
The palace of great Lucifer (so call 
That structure, in the dialect of men 
Interpreted)45
Here Milton uses his familiar technique of suspending possibilities with enjambment. ‘[S]o 
call / That structure, in the dialect of men’ stands alone as an instruction, until ‘Interpreted’ 
on the next line opens up the gap between ‘structure’ and ‘dialect’ by showing that to ‘call’ is 
to interpret.
The same sentiment is expressed in Milton’s famous formulation ‘the meaning not the 
name I call’.46 The gap between language and its referents, ‘meaning’ and ‘name’, is opened 
up. Alienation seems a more apposite term than accommodation here, though the two 
practices, counterintuitively, overlap. As Killeen fully acknowledges in his study of 
accommodation, the task of ‘constru[ing] aspects of infnity for our comprehension’ is fraught 
with hermeneutic problems. To see Milton’s interactions with the ‘spaces between’ things as 
alienation or estrangement rather than accommodation is less problematic. Like 
accommodation, alienation calls for ‘proliferation in interpretation, as an injunction to close 
45 Paradise Lost V.760–62.
46 Ibid., VII.5.
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reading’,47 as Killeen says of accommodation, but it makes sense, in light of the similarities 
between Milton, Bacon, and Burton, to understand the ‘gaps’ as deliberately left open, to 
facilitate ‘proliferation’ indefnitely.
Milton’s Raphael’s mode of ‘Likening spiritual to corporeal | As may express them 
best’48 resembles Bacon’s pronouncement that ‘the subtlety of nature is far greater than that of 
the human sense and understanding’. Just as seventeenth-century encyclopedists held that 
there could be no nature ‘without the mediating work of the human understanding’, so Milton 
writes
Immediate are the acts of God, more swift 
Than time or motion, but to human ears 
Cannot without process of speech be told,
So told as earthly notion can receive49
‘So told as earthly notion can receive’ sounds like a ‘cognitive leap ... that construes aspects of 
infnity for our comprehension’, but Milton makes it clear that ‘process of speech’ undoes the 
very quality that it describes—that is, ‘immediacy’ is converted into its opposite, ‘process’. 
‘Speech’ and ‘acts of God’ are alienated from, not accommodated to, each other. The 
distinction between accommodation and alienation is a subtle one, but one worth making. 
Milton’s method does not so much accommodate ‘the acts of God’ as, by making strange the 
47 Killeen, ‘Accommodation’, p.109.
48 Paradise Lost VII.548.
49 Ibid., VII.176–79.
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‘process of speech’, force us to consider the mechanisms by which we understand the world, to 
interrogate them and understand that there are no facts, only interpretations.
Even Milton’s conclusion to Paradise Lost eschews conclusiveness. When Adam and 
Eve leave paradise in the fnal lines of the poem, ‘the world’ is ‘all before them’.50 They will 
‘choose their place of rest’ physically, but intellectually the vista of ‘the world ... all before 
them’ precludes rest. Discussion of the world in the poem has been conducted with ‘if’s, 
‘had’s, and ‘had not’s, each one a speculation, never a pronunciation, creating possible, but 
never defnitive, perspectives. The poem ends with yet another new perspective on the world: 
it is uninhabited, new and unknown. Ending at a beginning, the fnal lines serve as a reminder 
of Bacon’s warning that to conclude is to ‘terminate and extinguish investigation’. To begin to 
understand their new world, Adam and Eve will have to pose Burtonian ‘if’s and conduct 
Baconian speculations, seeking an encyclopedic knowledge that is, by its very nature, always 
just out of reach.
HAZEL WILKINSON 
50 Ibid., XII.646.
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